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Finding the weakest link(s): Coalition games for decentralized
discrete-event control
S.L. Ricker1 and H. Marchand2
Abstract— In decentralized discrete-event system (DES) ar-
chitectures, agents fuse their local decisions to arrive at the
global decision. The contribution of each agent to the final
decision is never assessed; however, it may be the case that
only a subset of agents, i.e., a (static) coalition, perpetually
contribute towards the correct final decisions. In casting the
decentralized DES control (with and without communication)
problem as a cooperative game, it is possible to quantify the
average contribution that each agent makes towards synthesiz-
ing the overall correct control strategy. Specifically, we explore
allocations that assess contributions of non-communicating and
communicating controllers for this class of problems. This
allows a quantification of the contribution that each agent
makes to the coalition with respect to decisions made solely
based on its partial observations and decisions made based on
messages sent to another agent(s) to facilitate a correct control
decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the classic formulation of decentralized control of
DES [1], [2], the contribution each controller makes towards
the global control decision is considered “equal” in the
sense that as long as at least one controller, based on its
partial observation of the system, can take the correct control
decision, the overall correct control strategy can be synthe-
sized. With the introduction of synchronous communication
between controllers (e.g., [3]), again, no one controller is
valued over another, as long as the communication protocol
allows, as before, at least one controller to take the correct
control decision, leading to the correct global decision.
Yet controllers are not necessarily equal in such a decision-
making architecture. When assigning a quantitative measure
to the process of reaching a control decision, the partial
observation of each controller coupled with the information
that it might be required to send and/or receive to allow
the collection of controllers to reach the correct control
decisions may render some controllers more “useful” than
others. To that end, we are interested in the problem of
coalition formation for decentralized controllers.
A solution concept from coalition games, the Shapley
value [4], provides one measure for assessing the contribu-
tions of a set of agents that cooperate to reach a specified
goal. If reaching a correct control decision is assigned a
value, then it is possible to allocate the total value of
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a complete control solution among the decentralized con-
trollers, where those that contributed to correct disablement
decisions are rewarded. Subsequently, we are interested in
casting the decentralized control problem (in the absence of
communication) as a coalition game, and using the Shapley
value to determine which subsets of decentralized controllers
are best combined to reach the control objective.
When a communication network plays a role in a coalition
game, the Myerson value [5] is the first allocation rule of
interest, where, like the Shapley value, each participant in the
game receives a payoff based on their contribution to achiev-
ing the overall goal. Unfortunately, the calculation of this
value is ultimately insensitive to the nuances of the network
formation. When decentralized controllers communicate, the
overall cost to solve the control problem is predicated on the
specific communication protocol amongst the players. Thus,
an appropriate allocation rule must take the configuration of
the protocol into consideration.
A variety of other allocation rules have been proposed in
the domain of network games as alternatives to the Myerson
value. The most notable is the Link-Based Flexible network
allocation rule [6], which rewards those links that prove
to be vital to the success of the game and allows for the
network to change, whenever the possibility for such flexi-
bility arises. We adapt a recently-proposed allocation rule for
dynamic networks [7] to the DES control and (synchronous)
communication problem. This new rule allows us to take
into account both the evolving network configuration and
the ability to synthesize a control and communication policy
among a group of controllers, some of whom are not always
active participants in the decision making.
Game theory has provided useful models for the analysis
of discrete-event control problems: Nash equilibrium of de-
centralized controllers [8] and synchronous communication
protocols [9]; fictitious play to examine optimal decentralized
controllers for intrusion detection [10]; Pareto optimality of
decentralized communicating controllers [11]. Furthermore,
coalitional game theory is starting to play a significant role
in evaluating network configurations in continuous control
theory [12], [13].
We review some concepts from decentralized control in
Section II. Section III introduces the Shapley value as applied
to the decentralized control problem without communication.
We also attune a new quantitative metric from dynamic
network games to assess the value of dynamically-forming
coalitions of communicating decentralized controllers, before
concluding in Section IV.
II. BACKGROUND
We assume the framework for supervisory control of
discrete-event systems as introduced in [14]. Hence, we
model a discrete-event system as a finite-state automaton
ML = (Q,Σ, TL, q0, F ),
where Q is a finite set of states, TL ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is a
transition relation, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and F ⊆ Q is
a set of final or marked states. (We will also use a version of
ML that contains self-loops of the empty string ε at each state
in Q: MεL = (Q,Σ ∪ {ε}, T εL, F ).) The transition relation is
easily extended to Σ∗ and we say L := {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃q ∈
Q s.t. q0
s7−→ q ∈ TL}. For L ⊆ Σ∗, we have L := {v ∈
Σ∗ | ∃w ∈ Σ∗, u ∈ L such that u = vw}. Then L is prefix-
closed if L = L. We assume prefix-closed languages for the
remainder of this paper. The regular language L generated
by ML describes the behavior of the uncontrolled system. In
addition, the alphabet Σ is the disjoint union of two types of
events: (i) observable and unobservable events Σ = ΣounionmultiΣuo;
and (ii) controllable and uncontrollable events Σ = ΣcunionmultiΣuc.
A. Decentralized control
The decentralized control problem arises when controllers,
denoted here by I = {1, . . . , n}, where n > 1, cooperate
by fusing their local control decisions about behaviors (e.g.,
disable or enable a specific event) to issue global control de-
cisions so that a specification language K ⊆ L is recognized
(where we have the corresponding automaton MK v ML).
The marked language of L is Lm := {s ∈ L | ∃q ∈
F s.t. q0
s7−→ q) ∈ TL}. The language K ⊆ L is m-closed if
K = K ∩ Lm. Henceforth, we assume that K is m-closed.
In the original formulation of the decentralized control
problem [1], there is no communication among controllers. In
the event that a control solution cannot be found in one of the
various decentralized architectures [1], [15], there are con-
ditions under which decentralized communication protocols
can be synthesized, allowing synchronously communicating
controllers to reach a control decision (e.g., [3], [16], [17]).
A decentralized control problem is characterized by each
controller’s set of local events that it observes Σo,i ⊆ Σo and
a set of local events it controls Σc,i ⊆ Σc, for i ∈ I . The
natural projection pii : Σ∗ → Σ∗o,i defines the observations
of an agent i ∈ I by removing all occurrences of events
in Σ \ Σo,i from a sequence in Σ∗. The inverse projection
pi−1i : Σ
∗
o,i → 2Σ
∗
captures all the sequences s that produce
the same natural projection for agent i. Formally, pi−1i (t) =
{s ∈ Σ∗ | pii(s) = t}, for i ∈ I , and can easily be extended
to languages. We will use the notation [[s]]i whenever we
refer to pi−1i pii(s). For further notational convenience, we let
Io(σ) = {i ∈ I | σ ∈ Σo,i}, and Ic(σ) = {i ∈ I | σ ∈ Σc,i}.
Definition 1: ([14]) A language K ⊆ L is controllable
wrt L and Σuc iff KΣuc ∩ L ⊆ K.
Thus, an uncontrollable event cannot take the system out of
the specification.
As the object of the control problem is to prevent se-
quences in L\K from occurring, we would like at least one
decentralized controller, based only on its partial observation,
to be able to definitively identify when a sequence in L \K
is about to occur [1].
Definition 2: A language K ⊆ L = L is unconditionally
co-observable with respect to L, Σo,i and Σc,i (i ∈ I) iff
(∀t ∈ K)(∀σ ∈ Σc)sσ ∈ L \K ⇒(∃i ∈ Ic(σ))[[s]]iσ ∩K =
∅. Note that when I = {1} (i.e., a centralized supervisor),
this property is called observability.
B. Synchronized composition
We use a special product called synchronized composition,
denoted by ×S , which is defined as follows. Assume that we
have k > 1 finite-state automata M1, . . . ,Mn, where Mj =
(Qj ,Σj , Tj , q0,j , Fj), for j = 1, 2, . . . , k. Then M = M1×S
M2×S . . .×SMk = (QS ,ΣS , TS , 〈q0,1, q0,2, . . . , q0,k〉, FS),
where QS ⊆ Q1×Q2× . . .×Qk; ΣS ⊆ Σ1×Σ2× . . .×Σk;
TS ⊆ QS×ΣS×QS ; and FS ⊆ F1×F2×. . .×Fk. The state
set QS is a set of state vectors of the form qS = (q1, . . . , qk)
and we will occasionally refer to the jth component of qS
as qS(j), where j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We can think of these
automata as running concurrently, and, thus, there is some
synchronization of events in each of the alphabets. The
alphabet ΣS is constructed using vector labels [18].
We build a structure using ×S where the components are
n+ 1 copies of MεL and the alphabet A, composed of both
observable Ao and unobservable subsets of labels Auo, is the
set of vector labels defined above: U = MεL×S ...×SMεL =
(X,A, TU , x0). U is a multi-purpose structure: we use it for
verifying co-observability and to construct our controllers.
To accomplish the former, we identify transitions of U
that correspond to violations of co-observability, namely a
state where a controllable event σ must be disabled in the
uncontrolled system, but all controllers that control σ, believe
that the system has generated (up to that point) a sequence
after which σ must be enabled.
Definition 3: The set of unconditional illegal configura-
tions for U is a set of transitions defined as follows.
B∨ := {x `−→ x′ ∈ TU | x(0) `(0)=σ−−−−→ x′(0) ∈ TL \ TK
and (∀i ∈ Ic[`(0)])x(i) `(i)−−→ x′(i) ∈ TK}.
When B∨ = ∅, we know that K is unconditionally co-
observable [17]. To synthesize the decentralized controllers,
under the condition that B∨ = ∅, we calculate the crushed
automaton of U w.r.t. each controller, which requires the
following equivalence relation on the state set of U .
Definition 4: ([19]) Let Ω = A. The relation ∼Ω is the
least equivalence on the set Q such that the following two
axioms are satisfied
A1 : (x, `, x′) ∈ TU and ` 6∈ Ω⇒ x ∼Ω x′;
A2 : (x1, `′, x′1) ∈ TU and
(x2, `
′, x′2) ∈ TU and x1 ∼Ω x2 ⇒ x′1 ∼Ω x′2.
The associated crushed automaton is κΩ[U ] = (X/∼Ω ,
[x0]Ω, Ω, TκΩ), where [x0]Ω is the equivalence class of
the initial state x0; and ([x]Ω, `, [x′]Ω) ∈ TκΩ if there
are states x1 and x′1 such that x1 ∼Ω x, x′1 ∼Ω x′ and
(x1, `, x
′
1) ∈ TU .
We construct a crushed automaton of U for each controller
i ∈ I using Ωi = {` ∈ A | `(0) = `(i) ∈ Σo,i}, and Ω0 = Ao.
For acyclic ML, κΩ0 [U ] is isomorphic to ML, whereas when
ML is cyclic, our solutions require an unfolding of the plant
up to κΩ0 [U ]. Note that a crushed automaton is based on
state equivalences and its construction has a computational
complexity of O(|X|+ |TU |).
C. State-based decentralized decision-making
In our control architecture, we use U for decentralized
decision-making. We classify the states of U as follows:
B(σ) := {x ∈ X | ∃x′ ∈ X s.t. (x(0), σ, x′(0)) ∈ TL \
TK ∧σ ∈ Σc}, where Bσ = ∪σ∈ΣcB(σ); G(σ) := {x ∈ X |
∃x′ ∈ X s.t. (x(0), σ, x′(0)) ∈ TK}.
Each controller i ∈ I makes its own local control decisions
about the system behavior based on its partial observations
via ∼Ωi . Let the finite set of local decisions LD= {0,1}.
Let the local decision function be hi : X →LDΣ
(∀i ∈ I)(∀x ∈ X)(∀σ ∈ Σ)
hi([x]Ωi)(σ) =
{
1, if σ ∈ Σc,i ∧ [x]Ωi ∩G(σ) = ∅;
0, otherwise.
(1)
To correctly solve the decentralized DES problem of
interest, a global decision GD= {0,1} is made by combining
the local decisions of the controllers in such a way that the
correct decision is taken overall1. Let the global decision
function be H : LDΣ
n →GDΣ.
We want to find local decision functions h1, . . . , hn such
that the global decision function H satisfies the following:
(∀σ ∈ Σc)(∀x ∈ B(σ))
H([x]Ω0)(σ) =
∨
i∈Ic(σ)
hi([x]Ωi)(σ) = 1;
(∀σ ∈ Σc)(∀x ∈ G(σ))
H([x]Ω0)(σ) =
∨
i∈Ic(σ)
hi([x]Ωi)(σ) = 0;
(∀σ ∈ Σuc)(∀x ∈ G(σ))
H([x]Ω0)(σ) =
∨
i∈Ic(σ)
hi([x]Ωi)(σ) = 0.
We can find such local decision functions (e.g., synthesize
decentralized controllers) for L iff K is controllable, m-
closed, and co-observable.2
1We focus on unconditional co-observability [1]; however our results
are easily applied to other decentralized architectures. Here we require
disablement decisions to produce a positive (non-zero) value, Hence, we
use disjunction as the fusion rule in lieu of conjunction.
2When communication is involved, replace H by H?, hi by h?i and
Ωi by Ω?i (for i ∈ I0). Note that Ω0 = Ω?0 since the 0th “agent” has
observation set Σo and no access to any communications sent or received
by the decentralized agents.
D. Decentralized control with synchronous communication
When decentralized controllers have the ability to com-
municate among themselves (e.g., point-to-point, broadcast),
they do so via a communication protocol. We adopt the
strategy introduced in [17] where subsets of observable tran-
sitions are identified as possible communication transitions
corresponding to messages to be sent from sender/controller
i to receiver/controller j, denoted by T !?ij ⊆ To,i for i, j ∈ I .
We rely on an architectural property of U that provides
a straightforward means of identifying potential communi-
cation transitions with which we build a communication
protocol, denoted by T ! ⊆ ∪i,j∈IT !?ij :
Definition 5: (Adapted from [22].) The diamond/step
property holds at x1 ∈ X if there exist i, j ∈ I and labels
`1 ∈ Ao, `2 ∈ Auo such that `1(0) = `1(i) = γ ∈ Σo,i,
`2(j) = γ 6= ε and `1 ∨ `2 ∈ A that satisfy the following
axioms:(a) x1
`1−→ x2, x1 `2−→ x3 ∈ TU ∧`1|`2 ⇒
(∃x4 ∈ X)A x1 `1∨`2−−−→ x4 ∈ TU ; (b) x1 `1∨`2−−−→ x4 ∈
TU ∧ `1|`2 ⇒ (∃x2 ∈ X)x1 `1−→ x2, x2 `2−→ x4 ∈ TU ; (c)
x1
`1−→ x2, x2 `2−→ x4 ∈ TU ∧ `1|`2 ⇒ x1 `1∨`2−−−→ x4 ∈ TU .
Subsequently, we say that at x1 we have a possible commu-
nication transition x1
`1∨`2−−−→ x4 w.r.t. sender i and receiver
j.
Choosing a communication transition to add to a com-
munication protocol means that we must remove or prune
x1
`1−→ x2 and x1 `2−→ x3 from U . Furthermore, we must also
remove these transitions at all states that are equivalent to
x1 for the sender:
(∀x ∈ [x1]Ωi)∃x′′ ∈ X s.t. x `1−→ x′′ ∈ TU
⇒ TU = TU \ {x `1−→ x′′};
and the receiver
(∀x ∈ [x1]Ωj )∃x′′ ∈ X s.t. x `2−→ x′′ ∈ TU
⇒ TU = TU \ {x `2−→ x′′}.
We also update the communication protocol for communi-
cating controller i: T !ij = T !ij ∪ {x1 `1∨`2−−−→ x4}.
The choice of a communication transition is not random:
we choose a communication transition so that, after pruning,
an illegal configuration in B∨ becomes unreachable. There
are a finite number of illegal configurations to eliminate and
when all of these are removed from U , then we conclude
that unconditional co-observability has been restored via
communication [17].
Definition 6: Two states x, x′ ∈ X are indistinguishable
to supervisor i, denoted x ∼ix′, where ∼i is the least
equivalence relation such that
(1) x
〈`(0),...,`(i)=ε,...,`(n)〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x′ ⇒ x ∼i x′;
(2) x
〈ε,...,ε,`(i)6=ε,ε,...,ε〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x′ ⇒ x ∼i x′;
(3) x ∼i x′ ∧ (x, `, x′′), (x′, `, x′′′) ∈ TU ⇒ x′′ ∼i x′′′.
In addition to allowing the communicating decentralized
supervisors to make the correct control decisions, a com-
munication protocol must operate in an observationally-
equivalent manner.
Definition 7: A communication protocol T ! =
∪ij∈I,i6=jT !ij is feasible iff (∀i, j ∈ I)(∀x, x′ ∈
X) (x, `, x′′) ∈ T !ij ∧ (x′, `, x′′′) ∈ TU ∧ x ∼i x′ ⇒
(x′, `, x′′′) ∈ T !ij .
Thus, a protocol is feasible if whenever supervisor i sends a
message to supervisor j at state x, the same communication
occurs at all states that supervisor i considers observationally
equivalent to x. Henceforth, we assume that all communica-
tion protocols we discuss are feasible.
III. DECENTRALIZED DES AS COALITIONAL GAMES
A coalitional game with a transferable utility is a pair
(I, v), where I is a set of players and v is a characteristic
function that provides a quantitative measure, which can be
used to compare the effectiveness of different coalitions [20].
In particular, the interest lies in which coalition of players
C ⊆ I will form and how v will be distributed to the members
of C. The grand coalition is the name given to the coalition
of all agents in I . Subsequently, we define the characteristic
function v : C → R that assigns a real number representing
the quality of the coalition’s efforts. Notably, v(∅) = 0. A
solution to a coalitional game is a method for dividing v(I)
among the players.
A. Games without networks
An important solution concept for cooperative games,
called the Shapley value, defines a weighted average of each
player’s marginal contribution across different coalitions.
Definition 8: ([4]) The Shapley value for player i ∈ I ,
denoted by φi, is a measure of the relative importance of
every player in a coalition game:
φi(I, v) =
1
|I|!
∑
C⊆I\{i}
|C|!(|I| − |C| − 1)![v(C ∪ {i})− v(C)].
While the computation of the Shapley value requires ex-
haustive enumeration of coalitions, efficient algorithms have
recently been proposed [21].
We will use the Shapley value to assess the average contri-
bution of each controller to all possible coalitions. Because
the characteristic function is superadditive, the assumption
is that players/controllers will form the grand coalition, as it
provides the optimal allocation of value for I .
Although there are many different characteristic func-
tions that could be designed for decentralized DES control
problems, for simplicity, we recognize the combination of
the coalition’s information that corresponds to the overall
correctness of the control solution:
v(C) =
∑
x∈X
∑
σ∈Σc
HC([x]Ω0)(σ),
where HC([x]Ω0)(σ) =
∨
i∈C hi([x]Ωi)(σ).
While the Shapley value—as interpreted for decentral-
ized DES—indicates the contribution of each controller
towards the overall control solution, this information could
be incorporated into a variety of controller-related metrics.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
d1
c1
c2
b1
b2
c2
b1
d2
c1
c1
b1
d2
b2
d1
σ2
σ1
σ3
σ2
σ1
Fig. 1. Joint ML (all transitions) and MK (collection of solid transitions)
For example, to support a certain level of fault tolerance,
the characteristic function can be adjusted to guide the
selection of coalitions that provide necessary redundancy
for particularly important control decisions. In the event of
controller breakdown or temporary unavailability, are there
other controllers that can correctly take the control decisions
that the now absent controller took? Conversely, we can use
the Shapley value to deduce that a controller is not necessary.
For costly controllers, it may be important to determine
the cheapest set of controllers that can solve the control
problem. Similarly, identifying the smallest set of controllers
(i.e., minimally optimal cardinality) that take all the correct
control decisions may be a performance priority.
Example 1: We will use ML and MK in Fig. 1 to con-
struct U (not shown) and subsequently examine different de-
centralized non-communicating coalitions. Let I = {1, 2, 3}
where Σo,1 = {b1,b2, σ1, σ2, σ3}, Σo,2 = {c1, c2, σ1, σ2, σ3}
and Σo,3 = {d1,d2, σ1, σ2, σ3}. Furthermore, let Σc,1 =
Σc2 = Σc,3 = {σ1, σ2, σ3}.
It is the case that K is co-observable (Definition 2). This
can also be verified using U : (∀σ ∈ Σc)(∀x ∈ X)x ∈
B(σ)⇒ (∃i ∈ Ic(σ))[x]Ωi ∩G(σ) = ∅.
We are interested in the following states where
disablement decisions must be taken: (11, 11, 11, 11),
(11, 11, 11, 14), (11, 14, 11, 11), (11, 14, 11, 14) ∈ B(σ1),
(10, 10, 10, 10), (10, 13, 10, 10) ∈ B(σ2) and
(12, 12, 12, 12) ∈ B(σ3). Note that {(11, 11, 11, 11),
(11, 11, 11, 14), (11, 14, 11, 11), (11, 14, 11, 14)} ⊂
[(11, 11, 11, 11)]Ωi , for all i ∈ I . Similarly,
{(10, 10, 10, 10), (10, 13, 10, 10)} ⊂ [(10, 10, 10, 10)]Ωi and
{(12, 12, 12, 12)} ⊆ [(12, 12, 12, 12)]Ωi , for all i ∈ I .
Using Eq. (1) to calculate local control decisions, there is
at least one controller that can take the correct disablement
decision for σ1, σ2 and σ3: h2([(11, 11, 11, 11)]Ω2)(σ1) =
1, h2([(10, 10, 10, 10)]Ω2)(σ2) =
h3([(10, 10, 10, 10)]Ω3)(σ2) = 1, and, for all i ∈ I ,
hi([(12, 12, 12, 12)]Ωi)(σ3) = 1.
In Table I we calculate the characteristic function for
all possible coalitions, where there are three disablement
decisions to take. Although not shown in Table I, the order
of the coalition does not matter, i.e., v({2, 3}) = v({3, 2}).
TABLE I
v(C) FOR C ⊆ {1, 2, 3}
C {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(C) 1 3 2 3 3 3 3
To calculate the Shapley value of controller 1, we must
consider coalitions that do not include it: ∅, {2}, {3} and
{2, 3}.
φ1(I, v) =
1
6
[2(v({1})− v(∅)) + (v({1, 2})− v({2}))
+ (v({1, 3})− v({3}))
+ 2(v({1, 2, 3})− v({2, 3}))] = 1
2
.
The Shapley values of the remaining controllers: φ2(I, v) =
9
6 ; φ3(I, v) = 1. Note that the sum of the Shapley values is
equal to the value of the grand coalition. For this particular
example, controller 2, on average, contributes the most value
to the control solution. If minimizing the cardinality of the
size of a coalition is an important metric, while still ensuring
that all the correct control decisions are taken, then the
optimal coalition is C = {2}. 
B. Games with networks
When players require communication to coordinate their
activities, the organization of the channels that define how
the players communicate is described by a network. A
coalition C in this context is characterized by a sequence of
configurations of the network, where not all players may be
connected depending on how the network evolves. A network
λ ⊆ {ij | i, j ∈ I ∧ i 6= j} is simply a set of links ij that
indicates which players are connected. The empty network
λ∅ is one in which there are no connections between players,
whereas the complete network λI is simply the binomial
coefficient
(
n
2
)
, i.e., the set of all possible subsets of I of
size 2. The symmetric difference of two networks λ and λ′:
λ∆λ′ = (λ ∪ λ′) \ (λ ∩ λ′). Unlike the previous situation,
the coalition here is not static from the start of the execution
of the system to its end: the membership changes based on
the communication requirements needed to take the correct
control decisions.
One of the criticisms of the Myerson value is that it is
insensitive to the specific communication network formed
by the elements of λ. It is possible to find examples where
two different communication networks among the same set
of players produces the same final allocation. In the context
of a decentralized DES framework, we have two extensions
to the network model that we must address. It may not be that
communication is required to ensure all the correct control
decisions are taken. Specifically, a single controller may have
sufficient knowledge to take the correct control decision in
the absence of communication. So while the definition of
λ precludes a link of ii, we will allow λ to be coupled
with, when necessary, single controllers in I that are not
already part of a link in λ. Secondly, we must identify the
links available for communication between controllers, and
also the message(s) that must be sent from the sender to the
receiver. We extend the definition of network to include the
messages being sent across the links λ. That is, the enhanced
network that we will work with is λ! ⊆ (λ ∪ I)× (T ! ∪ ∅),
where ∅ represents the absence of messages sent along a
given link in λ.
To take into account the evolution of a network, say
step by step over a finite horizon W , we construct a
sequence of enhanced networks, called a scenario: Λ! =
λ!0, λ
!
1, . . . , λ
!
W−1. For the decentralized DES framework, we
let
W = max
x∈B(σ)
d(x0, x),
where d(x1, x2) is the “distance” between states in terms of
the number of observable labels along an acyclic path from
state x1 to x2 in U . We denote the change in the network
from step k to k+ 1 by λ!k → λ!k+1. An elementary change
is made when the λ!k+1 differs by only a single link from λ
!
k,
i.e., ignore the messages but focus on how the set of senders
and receivers changes from one step to the next. When a
change is not elementary, then it is necessary to compute
the sequence of elementary changes that takes the links in
λ!k to those in λ
!
k+1.
We construct Λ that describes, over all the violations of
unconditional co-observability, the dynamics of the extended
network formation. It is necessary to describe a condition
under which we can ensure that despite the changing mem-
bership of the active decision makers, all the correct control
decisions can still be taken.
Definition 9: U is Λ-observable iff ∀x ∈ B(σ) ∃λ! ∈ Λ
such that [x]
Ωλ!
∩G(σ) = ∅.
We propose two different strategies for forming scenarios
that produce a Λ-observable version of U : myopic and
farsighted. For the former strategy, we want to choose the
first possible communication opportunity to resolve a viola-
tion of unconditional co-observability. A farsighted strategy
exercises the opposite approach: postpone communication as
long as possible. Algorithm 1 employs a myopic approach to
ensure Λ-observability; however, to adapt the algorithm to be
farsighted, simply change “minimal” to “maximal”, with the
understanding that we are always assuming maximal acyclic
distances.
The myopic algorithm proceeds as follows: for each dis-
ablement state in U , we want to find a the scenario that will
allow at least one controller to take the correct disablement
decision before the system leaves K. If the disablement
state is part of an illegal configuration, then we want to
find the “earliest” possible communication transition that will
result in the illegal configuration being unreachable. In our
context, “earliest” refers to a state where the diamond/step
property holds, the illegal configuration can be resolved, and
the number of observable events that occur from the initial
state to a state where the diamond/step property holds is
minimal. The sender is a controller that observes the event
encoded in the communication transition and the receiver
is a controller capable of taking the control decision for
the illegal configuration in question. At this point we have
identified the extended network at this step (i.e., the number
of observable events) along with the message. We must then
identify all feasible communications and incorporate them
into the current scenario. If the disablement state is not part
of an illegal configuration, then we simply identify any of
the controllers capable of taking the control decision and
add them to the extended network as a non-communicating
participant.
Once we have identified the scenarios for U , we can calcu-
late the value that will be distributed among the decentralized
controllers.
Definition 10: (adapted from [7]) The link-based sce-
nario allocation rule for dynamic network processes, over
a finite horizon W , is given by:
φΛ(v) =
W−1∑
k=0
(φ
λ!k→λ!k+1
i (v))i∈I , (2)
where, for an elementary change of scenarios,
φ
λ!k→λ!k+1
i (v) =

1/2(v(λ!k+1)− v(λ!k)), if (ij, ·) ∈ λ!k+1∆λ!k;
v(λ!k+1), if (i, ∅) ∈ λ!k+1∆λ!k;
0, otherwise.
If the change between scenarios is not an elementary one, the
computation of φ
λ!k→λ!k+1
i (v) is significantly more complex
and requires the computation of a weighted average over the
transformation of the non-elementary change to a sequence
of elementary changes [7]. The example presented below
features scenarios with only elementary changes, and thus
we restrict the discussion to the more straightforward version
of the allocation rule.
To apply the link-based value to our setting, we assume
that the uncontrolled system does not satisfy co-observability,
so we must construct feasible communication transitions
T ! and ensure that the system is coalition-observable over
Λ. Thus, the value of our coalition for any given network
configuration is determined by the number of correct control
decisions that can be taken when λ! is the communication
protocol:
v(λ!) =
∑
x∈X
∑
σ∈Σc
Hλ
!
([x]Ω0)(σ),
where Hλ
!
([x]Ω!0)(σ) =
∨
i∈λ! h
!
i([x]Ωλ!i
)(σ), and Ωλ
!
i is the
local alphabet induced by λ! for controller i.
Intuitively, the addition of a communication produces a
value of at least 1. This characteristic function does not
impose a penalty for the evolution of the network and any
costs that might be associated with changing communication
links. Thus, this version of v assumes that all communi-
cation between controllers is possible. In this case we can
use our result to minimize the number of communications
between controllers, differing from the quantitative strategy
introduced in [17]. In this case we could simply fix a static
extended network λ! (where all scenarios Λ are simple finite
sequences of the same λ!) and directly use φΛ(v) (or perhaps
a minor adaptation) to determine an optimal communication
strategy. This remains the subject of future investigation.
Example 2: We will use ML and MK in Fig. 2 to build
U , and to examine the link-based network allocation value
of a decentralized DES with communicating controllers.
Let Σo,1 = {a, σ1, σ2, σ3}, Σo,2 = {b, σ1, σ2, σ3} and
Σo,3 = {c,d, σ1, σ2, σ3}. Furthermore, let Σc3 = {σ3} and
Σc,1 = Σc,2 = {σ1, σ2, σ3}. This system does not satisfy
co-observability (Definition 2).
The full U structure for this example has 20857 states,
2835 potential communications to include in our set of
communications T !, 18 states where disablement decisions
must be taken, including 2 violations of unconditional co-
observability. The complete paths to the violations are shown
in Fig. 3. Of interest is the presence of potential com-
munication transitions (colored blue), which represents the
circumstance that communication chosen here is ill-advised.
Pruning at either (0, 0, 1, 1) to select a communication of
c from controller 3 to controller 2, or (3, 0, 4, 4) to select
a communication of b from controller 2 to controller 3,
does not make the illegal configuration at (15, 10, 10, 10)
unreachable. Thus, it is not the case that all communications
are useful.
We run Algorithm 1 on U using the myopic strategy where
W = 4, starting with violations in B(σ1), corresponding
to the occurrence of cba after which σ1 must be disabled.
For the myopic strategy, we choose a communication of the
first occurrence of c where the sender is controller 3 and
we actually do not care whether the receiver is controller
1 or controller 2. For the farsighted strategy, we choose
the first occurrence of b that controller 2 will communicate
to controller 1. Note that we do not choose for controller
1 to communicate the occurrence of a to controller 2, as
this information arrives to controller 2 too late for it to
avoid taking anything but the incorrect control decision (e.g.,
enabling σ1).
Thus, we have the following myopic scenario, where the
notation has been adjusted to reflect the relevant event that
requires disablement during the scenario execution: ΛMσ1 =
λ!0 = (λ
∅, ∅), λ!1 = ({31}, c), λ!2 = (λ∅, ∅), λ!3 = (λ∅, ∅). In
contrast, we have the following farsighted scenario: ΛFσ1 =
(λ∅, ∅), (λ∅, ∅), ({21},b), (λ∅, ∅).
Similarly we have the remaining scenarios:
• ΛMσ2 = (λ
∅, ∅), ({21},b), (λ∅, ∅), (λ∅, ∅);
• ΛFσ2 = (λ
∅, ∅), (λ∅, ∅), ({12},a), (λ∅, ∅);
• ΛMσ3 = (λ
∅, ∅), (λ∅, ∅), ({3}, ∅), (λ∅, ∅);
• ΛFσ3 = (λ
∅, ∅), (λ∅, ∅), ({3}, ∅), (λ∅, ∅);
We use Eqn (2) to calculate the distribution of value among
the controllers for each scenario. In both cases all three
controllers are involved in ensuring that the correct con-
trol solution is produced; however, the distribution varies
depending on whether we favour a myopic or farsighted
strategy. Note that there is a valid solution not reached by
either strategy that eliminates the participation of controller
3: the decision for disabling σ3 is made by either having
controller 2 communicate its observation of b to controller
1 or controller 1 communicating its observation of a to
controller 2. In this case, all correct control decisions can
Algorithm 1 Forming dynamic networked coalitions and Λ-observable U .
1: procedure FORMMYOPICDYNAMICCOALITIONS(U , {B(σ)}σ∈Σc , B∨)
2: for each σ ∈ Σc do
3: for each state x ∈ B(σ) do
4: Initialize Λ!σ = {λ!k ← (λ∅, ∅)}k=0,W−1
5: if x is involved in a violation in B∨ then
6: while there are still violations in B∨ involving x do
7: Choose (x′′, `′, x′′′) ∈ T !? that resolves violation (x, `, x′) ∈ B∨ such that distance d(x0, x′′) is
minimal
8: Let sender i ∈ I be chosen such that `′(i) ∈ Σo,i
9: Let receiver j ∈ I \ i be chosen such that j ∈ Ic(σ)
10: T !ij ← T !ij ∪ {(x′′, `′, x′′′)} ∪ FEASIBLE(x′′, `′, x′′′)
11: Add λ!d ← (ij, `′) to Λ!σ
12: Add feasible communications to Λ!σ
13: else
14: Choose i ∈ Ic(σ) that can take the correct control decision for σ at x
15: Let d(x0, x) be the minimal distance from x0 to x
16: Add λ!d ← (i, ∅) to Λ!σ
TABLE II
RESULTS OF LINK-BASED ALLOCATION RULE FOR EXAMPLE 2.
Controller 1 Controller 2 Controller 3
ΛMσ1 0.5 0 0.5
ΛMσ2 0.5 0.5 0
ΛMσ3 0 0 1
Totals 1 0.5 1.5
ΛFσ1 0.5 0.5 0
ΛFσ2 0.5 0.5 0
ΛFσ3 0 0 1
Totals 1 1 1
be taken, and each receives a value of 1.5, while controller
3 receives 0, keeping in mind that only members of the
extended network can take control decisions. If the cost of
establishing communication between controllers 1 and 2 is
less than that of bringing controller 3 into the extended net-
work, then this would be the optimal choice. At the moment,
Algorithm 1 favours non-communicating controllers who can
take the correct control decision over choosing to establish
a communication to facilitate the control decision. This is
because no illegal configuration exists in this case, so the
motivation for communication is not clear.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have presented an application of game theory to our
ongoing study of quantitative evaluations of decentralized
DES control. It may not be prudent to continue assum-
ing that all controllers should be treated equally in terms
of their value to the computation of the overall control
solution. Coalition games—with and without networked
communication—provide quantitative valuations that allow
a comparison of the relative contributions of each controller.
Such information is beneficial, in particular for applications
where the cardinality and/or overall cost of the controllers is
a concern, or when fault tolerance is required.
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